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Résumé : L’article présente une reconstruction brève de la conception de
preuve développée par Otto Hölder. La reconstruction se concentre sur la
critique de la conception axiomatique de David Hilbert en général et sur sa
conception des métamathématiques en particulier. On affirme que l’analyse
faite par Hölder des idées méthodologiques générales de Hilbert et surtout de
la structure logique des preuves fournie par Hilbert dans les Grundlagen der
Geometrie (1899) est très utile pour comprendre plus clairement la thèse de
van der Waerden affirmant le lien entre la conception de la preuve développée
par Hölder et la tradition établie par Kurt Gödel.
Abstract: In this paper I provide a brief reconstruction of Otto Hölder’s
conception of proof. My reconstruction focuses on Hölder’s critical assess-
ment of David Hilbert’s account of axiomatics in general, and of Hilbert’s
conception of metamathematics in particular. I argue that Hölder’s analysis
of Hilbert’s general methodological ideas and, more importantly, Hölder’s anal-
ysis of the logical structure of the proofs provided by Hilbert in his Grundlagen
der Geometrie of 1899 are helpful in reaching a clearer understanding of van
der Waerden’s claim linking Hölder’s conception of proof to the tradition es-
tablished by Kurt Gödel.
1 Otto Hölder’s forgotten legacy
Hölder’s reputation as a mathematician is well established. 1 Things look
different with respect to Hölder’s ideas about the philosophy of mathematics. 2
Philosophia Scientiæ, 17 (1), 2013, 117–129.
∗ I thank the anonymous reviewers for their remarks that led to important im-
provements of an earlier version of this paper.
1. Compare [Waerden 1939].
2. These ideas can be found in a series of works published between 1892 and 1935.
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The most important objective of Hölder’s philosophical thinking is the
clarification of the value and of the limitations of sign-use in mathematics
[Hölder 1924, 5]. Hölder is concerned about the emergence of a Zeitgeist char-
acterized by a unilateral confidence in symbolic practices, which he sometimes
calls “formalism”.
The first clear expression of this concern can be found in Hölder’s cri-
tique of Robert Graßmann’s conception of rigor [Hölder 1892]. Graßmann
claims that rigor can only be reached by putting in place a symbolic practice
in which the fundamental unity of concept and symbolic expression, between
analysis and synthesis, is conveyed. We recognize here Leibniz’s ideal of de-
veloping a thinking calculus, a Calculus Ratiocinator. 3 In his 1892 review of
Robert Graßmann’s book, Hölder tries to establish that Graßmann’s approach
falls short of accomplishing the methodological ideal of putting up a calculus
expressing the full harmony between conceptual content and symbolic expres-
sion. Hölder’s arguments also suggest, more generally, that the shortcomings
of Graßmann’s approach prove that Leibniz’s methodological ideal pursued by
Graßmann is utopian. 4
Hölder’s concern about the best way to understand the relationship be-
tween conceptual content and symbolic expression in mathematics was em-
phasized by van der Waerden. In his Nachruf auf Otto Hölder, which was
published in 1939, not long after Hölder’s death, van der Waerden praises
Hölder as someone having significantly contributed to an important transfor-
mation of mathematics “from the formal to the critical, from mere computation
to concept” [Waerden 1939, 55, my translation]. 5 And van der Waerden goes
on to claim that Kurt Gödel’s methods and results were the confirmation of
Hölder’s conception of method. Unfortunately, van der Waerden’s remarks are
brief, so that the precise nature of the link between Hölder’s account of method
on the one hand and Gödel’s methods and his philosophy of mathematics, on
the other, is left open.
The discrepancy between van der Waerden’s suggestion of a link between
Hölder and Gödel, on the one hand, and the lack of recognition of Hölder’s
philosophy of mathematics by posterity, on the other, is surprising. If van der
Waerden is right, modern history and philosophy of mathematics has failed
3. One important consequence of this is that, according to Graßmann, a rigor-
ous treatment of mathematics must be given independently of any theory of logical
inference. For Graßmann, a rigorous treatment of logic is only possible if logic is
developed as a symbolic calculus, that is, as a chapter of mathematics. Hölder agrees
with the former claim, but dismisses the latter (see below).
4. Here, I am, of course, only proposing an interpretation of Hölder’s critique
of Graßmann. In the 1892 review of Graßmann’s work, Hölder does not explicitly
mention this aspect of Leibniz’s conception. He mentions it, however, in 1924, in
a discussion of the place and value of symbolic methods in developing the logic of
relations. Hölder calls Leibniz’s idea of a Characteristica Universalis inadequate
[Hölder 1924, 274].
5. Hölder died in August 1937. Van der Waerden’s Nachruf was received by the
Annalen in May 1938. It was published in 1939.
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to take notice of an immensely fruitful contribution, provided by a first rate
mathematician. How can this be explained?
Gödel’s results concerning the limitations of a formal-axiomatic treatment
of arithmetic were published in 1931, seven years after the publication of
Hölder’s The Mathematical Method [Die mathematische Methode]. As far as
I can tell, Gödel nowhere mentions Hölder’s work. In the present context,
the interesting question is rather, how did Hölder receive Gödel’s results?
This major event could not have escaped Hölder’s attention. So far, how-
ever, I have been unable to find any documents recording Hölder’s reaction to
Gödel’s results. 6
Some of the remarks made by Hölder in 1924 concerning the work of
Gottlob Frege and of Giuseppe Peano on the foundations of arithmetic pro-
vide an interesting hint. Hölder emphasizes that the foundations of arithmetic
cannot be secured through a symbolic calculus. Hölder thinks that a careful
analysis of the symbolic proofs found in writings such as those of Frege and
Peano would reveal a vicious circle: it would turn out that these proofs are
based on the same sequential procedures, which they are supposed to justify
[Hölder 1924, 349]. 7
Hölder’s rejection of the methods of Frege and Peano and, more generally,
his strict rejection of symbolic logic (see below) may be one of the causes
having led to the poor reception of his ideas.
The structure and style of Hölder’s approach to these issues in his writings
may be the other cause. Hölder does not manage to develop a sufficiently
clear and rich philosophical conception capable to support his examination of
method. He writes not as a philosopher, but as a mathematician interested
in a clarification of the mathematical method. This may be seen as a major
limitation of Hölder’s approach. This limitation, however, is also an advantage,
for Hölder does not try to defend any particular philosophical school, nor does
he try to create a philosophical system of his own. He rather observes the
mathematical practice and the way it is reflected by philosophers, trying to
expose the issues on which the philosophical description fails to do justice to
the practice of the working mathematician.
The main objective of this paper is to give a brief presentation of some of
Hölder’s reflections concerning the limits of formalization and the role of arith-
metical intuition in mathematical deduction. I rely mainly but not exclusively
on Hölder’s The Mathematical Method of 1924.
6. If I am not mistaken, a detailed comparison between the philosophical ideas of
Hölder and those of Gödel is still missing.
7. Arguments of a similar kind are discussed below.
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2 The limits of formalization
The first important remarks on the subject are made in the Introduction to
the previously mentioned book. Hölder describes mathematics as a deduc-
tive science. Mathematical deduction, we are told, cannot be adequately
described in terms of syllogistic logic. An adequate description of mathe-
matical deduction requires the logic of relations. 8 And then Hölder warns
against looking for a deductive presentation of logic. Since logic is the sci-
ence of deduction, it would be inappropriate to seek a deductive theory of
deduction [Hölder 1924, 2].
The same topic is taken up a few lines further with respect to the logic of
relations. Hölder explains that in the hands of mathematicians, the logic of re-
lations was turned into a symbolic calculus known under the name of “Logistic”
[Hölder 1924, 4–5]. Hölder points out that in certain cases formalization may
prove helpful but only as a heuristic tool. He continues by rejecting the view
(which he attributes to Louis Couturat), that the formalization of logic is an
essential requirement for providing a truly scientific presentation of logic. He
explains his position as follows:
(. . . ) when in the course of a mathematical investigation new signs
(. . . ) are introduced, as this often happens, it is not possible to
justify the reasoning behind the introduction of those new signs,
by means of a new symbolic calculus. It is obvious that if this
could be done, and if the previous position would be adequate, 9
one would then be compelled to justify the latter symbolic calculus
by means of a new such calculus, and we would have to pursue
this process further indefinitely. We would thus reach (. . . ) an
“infinite regress”. 10 [Hölder 1924, 5]
8. Remarks such as these are typical for Hölder’s time. There is nothing original
or surprising about them. This also holds for much of Hölder’s detailed discussion
of the limits of syllogistic logic and of the virtues of the logic of relations given in
the 12th chapter of his book. The 12th chapter has the title “Preliminary general
logical remarks” [Hölder 1924, 247–277]. The chapter is, of course, important for
a reconstruction of the precise terms in which Hölder views this subject. Such a
reconstruction, however, goes beyond the purposes of the present paper.
9. Hölder returns to Couturat’s position later in the book. He criticizes Couturat
for regarding the symbolic treatment of logic as a necessary condition for logical
completeness. Hölder writes: “One must take into account the fact that each (. . . )
sign requires a rule describing its use; this rule, however, cannot be explained by
means of a new symbolic expression, but rather based on the meaning [Bedeutung] of
the sign alone” [Hölder 1924, 177]. In a footnote to this comment Hölder also mentions
Brouwer’s paper “Intuitionism and Formalism” [Brouwer 1913]. Hölder emphasizes
that from his own point of view, when it comes to the foundations of mathematics,
formalism is an inappropriate conception.
10. All the translations of Hölder’s texts are mine.
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Hölder relies here on a classical kind of argument often raised to emphasize the
limits of justification. One equally classical solution to this type of problem is
provided by the axiomatic method.
If we desire to provide an axiomatic treatment of a theory, then all we need
to do is to identify a finite adequate list of undefined primitive notions, and
a finite adequate list of first principles expressing properties of the primitive
notions (the axioms of the theory). Based on the chosen primitive notions
and axioms we can then state and deduce all other results of the theory in
case. One of the major hopes linked to the new axiomatic method, as it was
understood, for instance by David Hilbert and his school, was precisely the
conviction that a symbolic, axiomatic treatment of pure mathematics and of
logic would make it possible to prove the consistency of mathematics.
Hölder had carefully reflected on these matters independently of Hilbert,
and indeed before Hilbert’s work on the foundations of geometry was pub-
lished. As said, the first traces of Hölder’s thinking are visible in Hölder’s
review of Robert Graßmann’s Treatise on Number [Hölder 1892]. Here we find
the first expression of Hölder’s conviction that the axiomatic method cannot
be used for proving the consistency of arithmetic.
Before returning to Hölder’s arguments concerning the nature of mathe-
matical deduction, it is helpful to emphasize an important aspect of Hilbert’s
conception of proof, criticized by Hölder. Niebergall and Schirn describe
Hilbert’s conception of proof in the following terms:
While nowadays metamathematics is conceived as being formu-
lated and axiomatized in a formal language, Hilbert’s finitist meta-
mathematics qua contentual theory of formalized proof (. . . ) is
neither formalized nor axiomatized. It is supposed to allow only
intuitive and contentual reasoning, and, as Hilbert (. . . ) stresses,
this kind of reasoning is, by its very nature, free from axiomatic
assumptions. Due to this sharp distinction between formalized
mathematics and contentual metamathematics, the meanings at-
tached to the word “to prove” in the two “disciplines” are funda-
mentally different. In formalized mathematics, it means to in-
fer according to the formal rules of the calculus; in contentual
metamathematics, it means to show by means of contentual intui-
tively evident inference. It is precisely the intuition-based charac-
ter of metamathematical reasoning that is supposed to guarantee
its security and reliability. (. . . ) In a nutshell: Hilbert’s fini-
tist metamathematics is a non-formalized, non-axiomatized, and
surveyable “theory” with a non-mathematical vocabulary whose
intended domain consists of concrete and surveyable figures, in
particular, of formulas (e.g., axioms) and proofs. [Niebergall &
Schirn 1998, 274ff.]
Hölder believes that the difficulties involved in establishing the consistency of
formalized mathematics, cannot be conclusively dealt with, by means of the
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metamathematical shift proposed by Hilbert. Hölder thinks that the same
difficulties would sooner or later surface again in examining the proofs elabo-
rated at the level of contentual metamathematics. We would then, if the ideal
of a formal-axiomatic treatment is retained, sooner or later have to mathema-
tize metamathematics. In this case, however, we would run precisely into the
infinite regress described by Hölder above.
In the next sections of this paper I will present some of Hölder’s key ar-
guments advanced in support of this position. These arguments belong to an
alternative conception of mathematical proof outlined by Hölder in his The
Mathematical Method of 1924.
3 A genetic interpretation of Hilbert’s
axiomatic method
Hölder is not just skeptical about the possibility of proving the consistency of
arithmetic along the lines proposed by Hilbert. He finds no merit whatsoever
in seeking an axiomatic treatment of arithmetic. The main reason for this
is Hölder’s understanding of the value and limits of the axiomatic approach
in pure mathematics. The fundamental ingredient of this attitude is Hölder’s
account of the content/form distinction in mathematics. Let me explain this.
An axiomatic approach is needed and indeed natural in those sciences in
which there is a clear separation between the content dealt with and the con-
ceptual apparatus used in describing that content, that is, the theoretical form
used to shape the content. This is the case in empirical sciences such as geom-
etry or mechanics [Hölder 1924, 465–466]. Hölder’s approach to this matter is
typical for the positivist approach to natural sciences. In natural sciences the
axioms are hypothetical statements about the properties of sensible objects
[Hölder 1924, 374–493]. 11
The situation changes considerably if we shift our attention from empiri-
cal science to pure mathematics and particularly to arithmetic and logic. In
arithmetic and logic it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between the
content of the theory and its form.
In order to establish this, Hölder explores a large number of examples.
One such example is taken from geometry. We are told that in geometry we
often find geometric concepts and geometric proofs, which essentially rely on
our logical intuition of the sequence of the natural numbers. In such cases,
geometric concepts are used “not just formally but according to their con-
tent” [Hölder 1899, 58–59]. Here is one of Hölder’s examples used to illustrate
this situation.
11. Hölder quotes, for instance, the views of Moriz Schlick [Hölder 1924, 374–397]
and of Ernst Mach [Hölder 1924, 42–45; 464ff.]. I cannot discuss the details of Hölder’s
conception of the foundations of natural science here.
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Take, for instance, Hölder’s discussion of the construction of the concepts
square and n-gon. According to Hölder, the definition of the concept square is
a specification of a finite sequence construction-steps. 12 Finite constructions
of this kind do not involve arithmetical intuition. The situation changes in
the case of general concepts such as the n-gon concept. A definition of this
concept must provide a description of a sequential construction procedure. In
the case of the n-gon concept, however, the construction involved requires an
arbitrary, unspecified number of steps. It is therefore impossible to list all the
steps required one by one or to actually carry out the construction.
We can easily prove that in any equilateral triangle, square, regular pen-
tagon, etc., the sum of the distances of any interior point to its sides is in-
dependent of the position of the point, without using arithmetical intuition.
To state and prove a theorem such as: “In any regular n-gon the sum of the
distances of an interior point to its sides does not depend on the position of
the point” we need to go beyond the finite. The idea is that our ability to
frame certain general concepts and general proofs must be rooted in a special
faculty of our mind, the arithmetical intuition, our intuition of the sequence
of the natural numbers [Hölder 1924, 338ff.].
The simplest mathematical expression of arithmetical intuition is the arith-
metic of the natural numbers. The core of this is our ability to frame infinite
sequential procedures and use them in developing new concepts and proofs.
The sequence-concept [Reihenfolgebegriff] is the content and, at the same time,
the form of our thinking [Hölder 1924, 292–320].
In Über den Zahlbegriff, which was published in 1900, Hilbert contrasted
the genetic to the axiomatic approach to arithmetic and remarked that priority
should be given to the axiomatic method. Hölder is not against the axiomatic
method, but simply against giving it priority over the genetic method (which
Hölder prefers to call the synthetic method) in respect to consistency questions.
In a section with the heading “The so-called axiomatic presentation of
arithmetic illuminated from the perspective of the superposition of con-
cepts [Die sogenannte axiomatische Arithmetik, beleuchtet vom Standpunkt der
Überbauung der Begriffe]”, Hölder gives a clearer shape to his fundamental ob-
jection to the “formalism” which he attributes, for instance, to Couturat and
Hilbert. 13 Hölder achieves this by investigating Hilbert’s proof, given in his
Grundlagen der Geometrie [Hilbert 1899, 26 ff., 72ff.] of the commutative law
for the multiplication of certain objects.
Hilbert presents a system of axioms for “complex systems of num-
bers [complexe Zahlensysteme]” [Hilbert 1899, 26], a term already used
by Hermann Hankel. Hilbert defines his Zahlensysteme by introducing
12. First construct a line segment. Choose one of its endpoints. Draw a perpen-
dicular line to the segment through the point chosen, etc.
13. In this context it is perhaps interesting to note that Hölder also criticizes
Hermann Hankel’s use of the permanence principle in similar terms [Hölder 1924,
210–211].
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three groups of axioms. They are: “Sätze der Verknüpfung”; “Sätze der
Anordnung”; Archimede’s axiom. Hilbert uses these to define a totally or-
dered, Archimedean field.
Hölder’s general critique of Hilbert’s position is, as said, directed against
Hilbert’s belief that the consistency of arithmetic can be proved independently
of genetic considerations. At the same time, Hilbert’s 1899 proof of the com-
mutative law of multiplication discussed by Hölder has nothing to do with
the consistency of arithmetic. Hölder is aware of it. He obviously believes,
however, that his analysis of Hilbert’s proof of the commutative law reveals
that Hilbert’s axiomatic treatment of the matter essentially involves contentual
arithmetic, or, in other words, that Hilbert’s axiomatic treatment of the com-
plex system of magnitudes, tacitly relies on the genetic approach which it is
supposed to avoid. Hölder assumes that any axiomatic treatment of arithmetic
will require proofs similar to those discussed by him, so that his arguments
would count for those proofs as well. 14
Hölder begins his examination of Hilbert’s proof by reproducing the main
principles involved in his discussion of the proof:
a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c (7)
a+ b = b+ a (8)
a(bc) = (ab)c (9)
a(b+ c) = ab+ ac (10)
(a+ b)c = ac+ bc (11)
ab = ba. (12)
He describes Hilbert’s approach in the following terms:
We imagine certain objects of an arbitrary kind, which are not
numbers, but which allow two operations [Kompositionsweisen]
to be carried out on them. We call the operations “addition” and
“multiplication” (. . . ). It goes without saying that these opera-
tions must be distinguished from the addition and multiplication
of numbers. The two operations are taken to satisfy formulas (1)
to (5) above. A few other obvious principles are (. . . ) also stipu-
lated. Of particular importance is the Archimedean axiom which
is also adopted as a principle. The latter states that, provided
that a is smaller than b, by adding a to itself sufficiently often,
an object a + a + a + . . . + a can be manufactured [hergestellt ],
which is greater than b, that is, there is a multiple of a exceeding
b. [Hölder 1924, 320ff.]
14. For similar discussions of other proofs compare [Hölder 1924, 313ff.; 503–510;
511–515].
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Hölder then reproduces the most important steps of Hilbert’s proof. Here
I only discuss those steps of Hilbert’s proof, which according to Hölder in-
volve arithmetical intuition. To establish (6), Hilbert first proves the equality
ndmd = mnd. Hilbert’s proof goes like this.
Hilbert postulates the existence of a special unit e for which ae = ea = a
holds for any magnitude a. By repeatedly using axiom (4) we get:
a(e+ e+ . . .+ e) = a+ a+ . . .+ a; (10)
and by using axiom (5) we get:
(e+ e+ . . .+ e)a = a+ a+ . . .+ a. (11)
This leads immediately to:
a(e+ e+ . . .+ e) = (e+ e+ . . .+ e)a. (12)
The proof of ndmd = mnd is completed as follows: 15
Md · nd =
{(e+ e+ . . .+ e)d}{[e+ e+ . . .+ e]d} =
{(e+ e+ . . .+ e)d[e+ e+ . . .+ e]}d =
{(e+ e+ . . .+ e){d[e+ e+ . . .+ e]}}d =
{(e+ e+ . . .+ e){[e+ e+ . . .+ e]d}}d =
{{(e+ e+ . . .+ e)[e+ e+ . . .+ e]}d}d =
{(e+ e+ . . .+ e)[e+ e+ . . .+ e]}{d2} =
mnd2.
This step of Hilbert’s proof is analyzed by Hölder in the following terms:
This may leave the impression that in this proof proper arith-
metical reasoning has been switched off [ausgeschaltet ]. A closer
examination of the genesis [Entstehung ] of (10) and (11) leads,
however, to the contrary view. For instance, in order to obtain
(10) by using rule (4), one must first acknowledge that the re-
peated application of rule (4) to the expression:
a(e+ e+ . . .+ e) (13)
should be understood, for instance, as meaning
a(. . . (((e+ e) + e) + e) + . . .+ e).
The latter operation must produce the object a as its result, as
many times as the object e was present in the bracket of (13).
One therefore finds oneself counting the steps of the proof proce-
dure [Man denkt sich also wieder die Schritte des Beweisverfahrens
selbst gezählt ]. [Hölder 1924, 323ff.]
15. The variables m and n stand for natural numbers. The letters a and d stand
for arbitrary magnitudes.
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Examining the previous proof, one may be perhaps inclined to think that it
requires an explicit use of mathematical induction or, at least, that explicit
induction might be used to rewrite some of the previous steps. But this would
lead to adding the induction-axiom to the axioms actually used by Hilbert.
Hilbert, however, does not explicitly require induction here and neither does
Hölder. 16 Hölder simply emphasizes that this way of using the signs involves
counting the steps of the proof while proving. Expressions such as (13) may
look finite because the number of iterations in (13) is supposed to be finite.
At the same time, however, (13) involves, so to speak, second-order-counting.
There is, so to speak, first-order-counting involved in each of the individual
steps e; (e + e); (e + e) + e, etc. However, formulas such as (13) involve more
than that. In using them we quit the initial counting process, and view it as
accomplished. We proceed by counting the counting steps themselves, thus
reaching what I have called second-order-counting or perhaps, even better,
meta-counting. In this way certain steps of the proof are turned, while prov-
ing, into objects of the proof, which proceeds by further counting former steps
of the proof. Therefore each proof of this kind is, not simply a proof about
operations on magnitudes but rather also a proof about our way of conceptu-
alizing our operations carried out while proving. This is what Hölder means
when he speaks of contentual use of arithmetic and by concept-superposition
[Überbauung der Begriffe]. 17
Let me now turn to Hölder’s comments on Hilbert’s use of the Archimedean
axiom. Hilbert’s proof also relies on the following identities:
md < a ≤ (m+ 1)d (8)
and
nd < b ≤ (n+ 1)d. (9)
Hölder writes:
An exact analysis of the thinking pattern that led to the in-
equalities (8) and (9) also leads to a notable result. Using the
Archimedean axiom only states that not all multiples of d can be
16. Hölder does discuss the place of the induction-axiom in mathematics and argues
that inductive proofs require the contentual [inhaltlich] use of arithmetical intuition.
He does this independently of his reconstruction of Hilbert’s proof discussed here
[Hölder 1924, 313ff.]. For a very good discussion of the distinction between formal
and contentual induction in Hilbert’s work and of the difficulties linked with Hilbert’s
concept of finite concistency-proofs, compare [Tapp & Lück 2003]. Tapp and Lück
consider Poincaré’s critique of Hilbert and some of Skolem’s ideas on the debate, but
they do not mention Hölder.
17. Hölder explores a wide range of examples of this kind, independently of Hilbert’s
conception, in his detailed discussion of arithmetic [Hölder 1924, 161–198]. In par-
ticular, he claims that the commutative law for the multiplication of the natural
numbers already involves what I have called second order counting and thus involves
concept-superposition.
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smaller than a. From this one deduces that in the sequence of
multiples
1d; 2d; 3d; 4d; . . .
there must be a first that is not smaller than a. But since d
itself, that is, the first element of the sequence, was taken to be
smaller than a, there must be a multiple of that first element of the
sequence for which md is still smaller than a, whereas is (m+ 1)d
greater or equal to a; this proves (8). [Hölder 1924, 324]
Here arithmetical intuition is involved twice. First of all, it is involved in
the axiom itself. This axiom is nothing more than the expression of the idea
that it is possible to add d an indefinite number of times, until we find some
natural number k satisfying a ≤ kd. The axiom is used, so to speak, to cover
up arithmetical intuition. The second time it is involved in establishing the
existence of the number m. To find m we must conceive another sequential
procedure. We pursue the sequence 1d, 2d, 3d, . . . , kd backwards an indefinite
number of times until we find the least natural number (which we denote by
m+1) satisfying a ≤ (m+1)d. Once found, it is clear that md < a also holds.
In order to establish the existence of m + 1 we must appeal to the fact that
the set of the natural numbers is well-ordered. The Archimedean axiom and
the well-ordering principle depend on our ability to imagine certain sequential
procedures as being repeated for an unspecified number of times, and therefore,
on contentual arithmetic. The proof described here also involves concept-
superposition [Überbauung ] of concepts: in a first step, we use a sequential
procedure to generate k; this is followed by a second sequential procedure
which is attached on top of the first, and which leads to m.
Hölder concludes his discussion of Hilbert’s proof with the following inter-
esting general statement. If the consistency of arithmetic can only be proved
axiomatically, as Hilbert desires, we would then have to prove the consistency
of the system of axioms chosen. If such a proof were to be given indepen-
dently of genetic considerations, we would have to rely on yet another system
of axioms in order to achieve our goal. This however would require a new
system of axioms. We would thus get an infinite regress [recursus ad infini-
tum] [Hölder 1924, 325], so that a complete consistency proof could never be
accomplished. It could not be accomplished because, in the course of such a
proof, we would be forced to define new infinite procedures and based on them
introduce new synthetic concepts [synthetische Begriffe] in the sense explained
above. The Archimedean axiom is, as far as Hölder is concerned, not an axiom
but, since it depends on contentual arithmetic, a definition. 18
18. Hölder also points out that E. Study and L.E. J. Brouwer share similar views
[Hölder 1924, 325, footnotes 1 and 3].
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Conclusion
In the previous pages I presented a small sample of Hölder’s reflections con-
cerning mathematical deduction. The most important aspect found is Hölder’s
view that certain proofs involve what I have called second-order-counting or
meta-counting, something that Hölder calls concept-superposition. According
to Hölder, therefore, a deductive examination of certain theorems of arithmetic
involves self-referential moments. A sharp separation between deduction and
counting, of the kind involved in Hilbert’s distinction between mathematics
and metamathematics appears therefore, impossible.
Niebergall and Schirn point out that there is a complementarity between
Hilbert’s treatment of arithmetic, which requires coding numbers by signs on
the one hand, and the post-Gödelian tradition which relies on coding signs by
numbers, on the other [Niebergall & Schirn 1998, 174]. Hölder recognized that
counting cannot be switched off, that is, that formalization would require, in
a second step, mathematization. In this sense, Hölder’s investigations of proof
do anticipate Gödel’s methods.
Hölder’s methodological reflections have a great deal more to offer. I think
that Hölder’s methodological remarks belong to the intuitionist tradition. His
views are compatible with most of the seven tenets of intuitionist thinking pro-
posed by Tieszen [Tieszen 2005, 228ff.]. A detailed reconstruction of Hölder’s
particular brand of intuitionism is still missing.
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